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Abstract
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY IN THE SELETION OF NEW AUDIT
COMMITTEE MEMBER
by
Dongliang Lei
Advisor: Professor Joseph Weintrop
Prior studies investigating the selection of audit committee members (ACMs) often focus on
board-level and director demographic characteristics. In this paper, I investigate whether boards
select new ACMs from corporate environments with similar financial reporting quality. Using the
appointee firm’s financial report quality as a proxy for new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes,
I find that firms are more likely to appoint new ACMs with financial reporting attributes similar
to firms’ financial reporting culture for a sample of 275 new ACM appointments from 2007 to
2011. I find that firms appointing ACMs with relatively weak (strong) financial reporting attributes
are more likely to have decreased (increased) subsequent financial reporting quality. I also find
that firms appointing ACMs with relatively weak financial reporting attributes suffer more
deterioration on their subsequent financial reporting quality when their financial reporting culture
are more different from the ACMs’ financial reporting attributes.
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The Role of Financial Reporting Quality in the Selection of New Audit Committee Member
1. Introduction
In October 2014, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Investor
Advisory Group presented a report to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating their
concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees. There were concerns that audit committee
members may have less training, experience, and time than the auditors and executives they are
expected to oversee and scrutinize.1 As a result, concerns were raised that shareholders were not
being well protected. In this paper, I investigate if companies seek to address these concerns by
adjusting the composition of audit committees through the appointments of new audit committee
members (ACMs). Specifically, I investigate (1) if boards select new ACMs from corporate
environments with similar financial reporting quality; and (2) if the appointments of new ACMs
affect appointer firms’ subsequent financial reporting quality (FRQ).
The duties of the audit committee were initially outlined by the SEC.2 Concerns about the
ability of audit committees to monitor financial reporting and disclosure were elevated after
outbreak of some major reporting scandals. The role of the audit committee in oversight of
financial reporting and disclosure has become a topic of discussion among investors, regulators,
and academics since 2002. To address investors’ concerns and regain their confidence in the U.S.
security market, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted to implement requirements for the
responsibilities, composition and conduct of audit committee. Of interest in this paper is the
requirement section 301. Section 301 of SOX requires independent directors to serve on audit

1

Some investors suggested that the performance of audit committees should be reviewed by certain independent
evaluators and the evaluations of the audit committee should be reported publicly to shareholders. In brief remarks
to the Investor Advisory Group, SEC chair said that they had planned to issue a concept release exploring possible
avenues to elevating the work of audit committees.
2
Audit committee is mainly charged with responsibilities including oversight of financial reporting and disclosure,
selection and monitoring of independent auditors, and monitoring the internal control functions.
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committees. Further, all major stock exchanges (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX) enacted
new regulations requiring public companies to have an audit committee with at least three
members and to have at least one member with accounting or related financial expertise.
After SOX, companies proactively search for independent ACMs and ACMs with
financial reporting attributes. Many studies investigate the composition of ACMs focusing on
incumbent members’ personal characteristics. Klein (2002) document a positive relation between
ACM independence and firm’s FRQ. She argues that independent ACMs are less likely to be
influenced by the CEOs and more likely to protect shareholders’ interests by performing their
fiduciary duties. Other studies find that ACMs’ financial and accounting expertise is positively
associated with firms’ FRQ (Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi
2010). Their findings suggest that financial and accounting knowledge can provide ACMs with
an effective means of monitoring financial reporting process.
Some prior studies focus on incumbent directors’ fundamental financial reporting beliefs
and behaviors in earnings management. Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2012) document that a firm
sharing a common director with an earnings manipulating firm is more likely to manage earnings
in a similar fashion. They argue that incumbent directors’ beliefs on financial reporting could be
adversely influenced via board connection of shared directors, which results in lower firm FRQ.
Other studies focus on the selection of new director members. Westphal and Zajac (1995)
find that new directors resemble the existing board members in terms of functional backgrounds,
age, and education levels when boards are more powerful than the CEOs. Their results suggest
that boards are more likely to appoint new directors with demographic characteristics similar to
existing board members.

2

Different from prior studies, my paper looks at the new ACMs’ financial reporting beliefs
and their ability to monitor financial reporting. Since it is very difficult to specifically quantify
an ACM’s financial reporting beliefs, for the purpose of testing, I assume the FRQ of the
companies they come from represents their financial reporting beliefs and attributes.3
New ACMs’ individual financial reporting attitudes and beliefs are important factors that
could affect their own commitments and behaviors in fulfilling their responsibilities. An
individual committee member’s commitment and performance could have a strong impact on a
firm’s FRQ. In addition, new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes could also affect appointer
firms’ financial reporting culture through influencing other ACMs’ financial reporting beliefs
and behaviors. Thus, I argue that appointer firms may evaluate new ACMs’ financial reporting
attributes to determine if they align with the incumbent committee members’ financial reporting
norms. To find out whether firms strategically seek ACMs with comparable financial reporting
attributes, I investigate the association between appointer firms’ financial reporting culture and
new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes in the fiscal year prior to the appointments.
On the one hand, firms could appoint new ACMs with similar financial reporting
attributes. I propose that firms with high financial reporting quality (“Strong Firms”) will appoint
prospective ACMs with strong financial reporting attributes (“Strong ACMs”) to increase the
homogeneity and cohesiveness of committee membership. Homogeneity and cohesiveness
enhance communication between members, increasing board and committee effectiveness
(Westphal and Zajac 1995; Ingley and Walt 2003). For firms with low financial reporting quality
(“Weak Firms”), they might appoint prospective ACMs with weak financial reporting attributes
The audit committee members’ individual financial reporting attributes are defined as their attitudes, beliefs and
commitments in how intensively they should oversee the management and monitor the financial reporting of the
company. For example, how should managers use their judgments and discretions in applying controversial
accounting principles and how transparent financial information should be disclosed in the financial statements.
3

3

(“Weak ACMs”) for at least two reasons. First, Weak firms face big challenge in competing with
strong firms for qualified director candidates because weak firms’ high litigation risk could drive
potential qualified directors away from these firms.4 Second, relative to CEOs in strong firms,
those in weak firms are more likely to exercise power with less oversight and monitoring. CEOs
in weak firms are more likely to influence the selection process by avoiding ACMs inclined to
closely monitor management (Zajac and Westphal 1996; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999).
On the other hand, firms could appoint new ACMs with dissimilar financial reporting
attributes. Strong firms could be indifferent to prospective ACMs’ financial reporting attributes.
For instance, when firms select candidates to sit in multiple committees (e.g. compensation
committee and audit committee), appointer firms might value new member’s other
complementary expertise and have no preference on his financial reporting skills. Thus, strong
firms would appoint weak ACMs if new members’ other expertise is essential to serve the
compensation committee. For firms with low financial reporting quality, their incumbent
directors could have high litigation and reputation risk because these firms are more likely to
have earnings management, financial restatement, and fraud. Thus, it is likely that their boards
intend to appoint strong ACMs to improve firms’ financial reporting quality and to lower
incumbent members’ litigation and reputation risk.
In this paper, I use appointer firms’ FRQ in the fiscal year prior to new ACM
appointments as a proxy for firms’ financial reporting culture. To proxy for prospective ACMs’
financial reporting attributes, I use their appointee firms’ FRQ in the fiscal year prior to the
appointments. Following prior studies, I use several FRQ measures to proxy for new ACMs’
4

I argue that, relative to strong firms, weak firms are more likely to have higher litigation risk because they have
following characteristics: poor firm performance, high management discretions, and weak corporate governance
(Cornett et al. 2008; Farber 2005; Abbott et al 2004; Xie et al. 2003).

4

financial reporting attributes, including abnormal accruals models, small positive earnings and
negative earnings surprises avoidance (Jones 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Ge,
Matsumoto, and Zhang 2011).
To examine these questions, I construct a sample of 275 new ACM appointments from
Directorship Files of the GMI ratings database for Russell 3000 firms from 2007 to 2011.
Different from prior studies focusing on the board level characteristics and investigating the
samples of all existing directors, my paper focuses only on appointments of new ACMs that
come from outside the appointer firms.5 My sample consists of only active corporate executives
from other companies for two reasons: first, corporate executives (e.g. CEOs, CFOs) from
outside firms are regarded as valuable outside directors with unique expertise and business
experiences that can monitor and advise the incumbent management in a way that other outside
directors are not able to (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz 2010). Second, corporate executives
represent the “tone of the top” in their firms and they have direct and influential links to firms’
financial reporting quality.
Controlling for appointer firms characteristics, corporate governance environments, and
new ACMs’ individual characteristics, I document a significant positive association between
appointer firms’ financial reporting quality and new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes in the
fiscal year prior to the appointments. The results suggest that appointer firms are more likely to
select new ACMs with financial reporting attributes similar to firms’ financial reporting culture.

5

Many prior studies focus on the board level characteristics and perform their tests using samples of all existing
directors. For example, boards and audit committees with more independent directors are negatively associated with
earnings management and financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002). Directors and ACMs with specific
expertise, skills and knowledge can better enhance firms’ corporate governance and performance (DeZoort and
Salterio 2001; Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2010).
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The results also suggest that new ACM’s financial reporting attributes are important factors that
appointing firms would consider in the ACM selection process.
Next, I investigate how appointments of new ACMs affect the appointer firms’
subsequent financial reporting quality. In my change analyses, I find that firms appointing ACMs
with similar financial reporting attributes are more likely to have very little change in firms’
subsequent FRQ. However, firms appointing relatively weak (strong) ACMs would have
decreased (increased) subsequent FRQ. In addition, I document that strong firms appointing
ACMs with relatively weak financial reporting attributes suffer more deterioration on their
subsequent FRQ when their financial reporting culture are more different from the ACMs’
financial reporting attributes.
Using a sample of new non-ACM director appointments (e.g. compensation committee
members and nominating committee members), I also test the impact of financial reporting
attributes on the selection of non-ACM directors. I find no significant association between nonACM directors’ financial reporting attributes and appointer firms’ FRQ. The results suggest that
appointer firms do not prefer selecting new non-ACM directors with financial reporting
attributes similar to their firms’ financial reporting culture.
In the robustness tests, I use different financial quality measures to proxy for new ACM’s
financial reporting attributes and re-examine the new ACM selection model. I find that appointer
firms’ financial reporting quality is positively associated with new ACMs’ financial reporting
attributes in the fiscal year prior to the appointments. The results suggest that appointer firms are
more likely to appoint new ACMs with financial reporting attributes similar to their firms’
financial reporting culture.

6

My paper contributes to the ACM selection literatures in the following aspects. First,
different from prior ACM selection literatures focusing on board-level characteristics and
incumbent members’ characteristics, my paper investigates how new outside ACMs’ financial
reporting attributes affect firms’ decisions on selecting new ACMs. I document that firms
strategically seek new ACMs’ with individual financial reporting attributes similar to their
financial reporting culture. This finding suggests that new ACM’s financial reporting attributes
are important determinants of new ACM selection.
Second, I document that appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ is affected by new ACMs’
financial reporting attributes. I find that firms appointing relatively weak (strong) ACMs would
have decreased (increased) subsequent FRQ. I also find that firms appointing ACMs with
relatively weak financial reporting attributes suffer more deterioration on their subsequent
financial reporting quality when their financial reporting culture are more different from the
ACMs’ financial reporting attributes.
Third, I also examine the selection of non-ACM directors and find no significant positive
association between non-ACM directors’ financial reporting attributes and appointer firms’ FRQ.
I find that appointer firms do not appoint new non-ACM directors with similar financial
reporting attributes. The results suggest that non-ACM directors’ financial reporting attributes
are not determinants of director selection.
Last, my results provide an implication to the recent debate on the quality of audit
committee. On one hand, I find that firms could have lower subsequent FRQ if they appoint a
new ACM with relatively weaker financial reporting attributes. This finding may support some
investors’ and regulators’ concern that a weak ACM might adversely impact firms’ FRQ. On the
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other hand, I find that about 58% of the firms appoint new ACMs with financial reporting
attributes highly similar to their financial reporting culture, which would decrease the committee
heterogeneity and increase committee effectiveness. This suggests that many firms do have a
selection mechanism for self-improvement in practice. This selection mechanism might ensure
the continuity and consistency of audit committees’ quality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background
and literature review. Section 3 develops my hypotheses. Section 4 provides my research design
and section 5 discusses data. Section 6 discusses my main results, section 7 presents additional
analyses, and section 8 concludes.

8

2. Institutional Background and Literature Review
A board of directors is elected by the shareholders to oversee the activities of a company.
Board responsibilities include CEO selection, succession and compensation; discussing,
reviewing and approving strategic decisions; nominating suitable candidates for election to the
board; appointing and dismissing the independent auditor; and providing monitoring, advising
and resource provisioning functionality (Withers et al., 2012; Renee et al. 2008). In a U.S.
publicly traded company, these responsibilities are usually shared by three committees of the
board: the audit committee, the compensation committee, and the nominating/governance
committee.
The audit committee plays an important role in fulfilling the board’s corporate
governance and oversight responsibilities. The audit committee is charged with the following
responsibilities: the transparency and accuracy of financial reporting and disclosures,
effectiveness of internal and external audit functions, the robustness of internal controls and
internal audit systems, and oversight of the company’s risk management policies and programs
(Kukreja 2012).
The nominating committee of the board of directors is mainly charged with the task of
identifying, screening, and nominating new members. In the United States, director candidates
are usually identified through either director networks or professional recruiter firms and then
screened by the nominating committee composed of all independent directors. After the
nominating committee screens and ranks the candidates, all other board members and the CEO
usually meet the candidates. Only those most qualified candidates are nominated and voted by
the shareholders (Withers et al., 2012; Monks & Minow 2004).

9

The ACM selection decision is a two-way process in which appointer firms and
candidates come together to produce the selection outcome. On the candidate side, the
candidates’ demographic characteristics, skills, expertise, and experiences underlie their abilities
to contribute to the board.

On the appointer firm side, board-level and firm-level factors

determining ACM selection includes firm size, firm performance, firm corporate governance
environment and board characteristics.
2.1 Director Expertise, Experience and Backgrounds
New ACMs with unique expertise, knowledge and experiences are usually favored by
appointer firms because their expertise and skills help the boards to fulfill their duties more
effectively and enhance firms’ financial reporting quality. For example, ACMs with financial
knowledge are more effective in overseeing the financial reporting process and ensuring highquality financial reporting because they better understand auditing and financial reporting
matters and clearly discern the substance of any disagreement between management and external
auditors (DeZoort and Salterio 2001). Likewise, Abbott et al. (2004) document a significant
negative association between audit committees with financial expertise and financial statement
restatements. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that accrual quality is positively associated with audit
committee members’ accounting expertise. These findings suggest that financial and accounting
knowledge provide audit committee member with an effective means of monitoring financial
reporting process. Other studies also provide evidence that investors react positively to the new
appointment of financial experts to a firms’ audit committee (Davidson, Xie and Xu 2004).
In addition, new directors with industry expertise have knowledge of the opportunities,
competition, technology and even the regulations of a specific industry. This knowledge enables
such directors to understand the dynamics of the industry and facilitates their review and
10

approval of management’s strategic decisions (Castanias and Helfat 2001). Also, Kor and
Sundaramurthy (2009) argue that directors develop business connections with suppliers,
distributors and consumers in the industry, which helps firms to acquire resources, expand their
business networks and achieve firm growth. Thus, appointer firms could seek new directors’
with industry expertise to join the board.
2.2 Director multiple directorship
Prior studies have documented mixed evidence on whether having corporate directors
sitting on multiple boards is harmful or beneficial to a firm. Directors with multiple directorships
can provide management with access to a variety of key resources, such as capital, suppliers, or
customers. In addition, directors with multiple directorships are more effective in detecting and
reducing earnings management because they are more likely to engage in effective monitoring to
maintain and protect their reputation (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003). Yang and
Krishnan (2005) find that audit committee members’ experience on other boards as outside
directors is positively associated with lower quarterly abnormal accruals. Carcello and Neal
(2003) provide evidence that audit committee directors with multiple directorships are less likely
to support dismissal of the auditor following a going concern opinion.
Sitting on multiple boards could be detrimental to firms’ governance or performance due
to the distractions and time constraints. Beasley (1996) documents a positive relationship
between the number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside directors and the
likelihood of financial statement fraud. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report that firms with busy
directors have weak corporate governance and relatively poor performance. New director’s
multiple directorships could be a determinant of director selection.

11

2.3 Female Directors
Several studies find that appointments of female directors are positively associated with
subsequent firm performance and they argue that female directors often have diverse and
valuable knowledge, information, or skills and their presences enrich board perspectives, debate
and decision making (Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003). Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui (2007) find
that earnings quality is higher for firms with female directors or firms with higher proportion of
female directors on the board. Gul et al. (2007) argue that not only do women demonstrate
greater risk aversion and ethical behaviors but also they are better at obtaining voluntary
information which reduces information asymmetry between women directors and managers.
2.4 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality
There is a fundamental agency problem for firms with the separation of ownership (the
shareholders) and the control (management). Agency theory posits that managers’ behaviors are
driven by self-interests and that they make decision to satisfy their self-interests. Managers
typically have more control over firm’s operational and financial information and they can
discretionarily withhold or disclose the information to shareholders (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and
Walther 2010). One effective way to mitigate the agency problem is to develop a corporate
governance mechanism that monitors the actions, policies and operations of corporate
management. Strong corporate governance mechanisms are generally associated with effective
monitoring of firms’ activities, alignment of interests of shareholders and the managers,
increased informativeness of financial statements and high firm financial reporting quality
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond 2008; Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007; Klein
2002).
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2.5 Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management
Prior studies use different measures to proxy for financial reporting quality. These
reporting quality measures include abnormal accruals, small positive earnings and negative
earnings surprise avoidance (Jones 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Ge, Matsumoto, and
Zhang 2011). Prior studies view these measures as indicators of earnings management, which is
assumed to erode financial reporting quality through reducing the usefulness and reliability of
earnings information (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010).6
Some accounting and financial reporting standards allow managers to exercise their
judgments when estimating and reporting firms’ financial conditions, which creates opportunity
for managers to manage earnings to window-dress firms’ financial statements, to increase their
compensations and to secure their jobs. Prior studies document that firms report incomeincreasing unexpected accruals prior to seasoned equity offers, initial public offers and stockfinanced acquisitions (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a, Teoh; Welch and Wong 1998b; Erickson
and Wang 1998).
A major strand of literature on earnings management investigates the abnormal accruals
generated from an accruals model.7 These studies measure firm’s total accruals and decompose
the total accruals into normal and abnormal components. The normal accruals are interpreted as
reflection of firm’s fundamental performance. The abnormal accruals reflect the distortion
induced by mis-application of accounting principles or earnings management. Thus, many prior
studies use abnormal accruals to proxy earnings management or low FRQ. For example, Xie,
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as: “Earnings management occurs when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that
depend on reported accounting numbers.”
7
The most common accruals models are the Healy (1985) Model, DeAngelo (1986) Model, the Jones (1991) Model,
the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995), and the Cross-sectional Jones Model (DeFond and Jiambalvo
1994).
6
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Davidson, and Dadalt (2003) use abnormal accruals to proxy FRQ and document that
independent board members and board members with corporate or financial backgrounds are
associated with lower abnormal accruals or higher firm FRQ.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that managers manage firms’ earnings
to avoid earnings losses. They investigate the pooled cross-sectional distribution of earnings and
find unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually high frequencies of small positive
income. The abnormal discontinuity of earnings distribution around zero earnings suggests that
managers intentionally manage earnings enough to report a small profit.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauseer (1999) document that meeting or beating the
consensus analyst forecast is an indication of earnings management based on the discontinuity in
the distribution of forecast errors. Other studies also provide evidence that firms use different
mechanisms to manipulate earnings to beat analyst forecasts, including managing tax expense,
the classification of income statement items and repurchasing stock (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and
Mills 2004; McVay 2006; Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson 2006).
2.6 Board size
The number of directors on a board is an important factor that affects board’s
effectiveness. Theory proposes that a larger board cannot perform its functions as effectively as a
smaller board because process losses increase as board size grows (Jensen 1993). For example,
larger boards impede the free and effective exchange of ideas between directors. In addition,
larger boards are less effective because of high coordination costs and free rider problems.
Yermack (1996) concludes that small boards are more effective in monitoring CEOs’ actions
because they make decisions more quickly and are less easily controlled by managers than large

14

boards. Vafeas (2000) document that earnings of firms with the smallest boards are perceived as
being more informative by market participants.
2.7 Percentage of independent outside directors
Researchers have also shown great interest in the percentage of independent, outside
directors. Boards dominated by outside directors are in a better position to monitor and control
managers because they are less likely to be influenced by the CEOs and more likely to protect
shareholders’ interests by performing their board duties. Weisbach (1988) documents that boards
with a greater proportion of outside independent directors are more likely to remove a poorly
performing manager. Shivdasani (1993) finds that firms whose boards have a greater proportion
of outsiders tend to make better acquisition-related decisions. Beasley (1996) finds a negative
relationship between the percentage of outside directors and the likelihood of fraud. These
findings suggest that independent outside directors contribute to strong corporate governance.
2.8 CEO/Chair duality
There is a considerable concentration of power in the hands of the CEO when CEO is
also the chair of board. Such CEO duality can establish strong and unambiguous leadership.
According to agency theory, however, the CEO/Chair duality promotes CEO entrenchment by
reducing board monitoring effectiveness. Jensen (1993) argues that it is difficult for the board to
perform its function effectively because CEOs cannot separate the function as the chair of the
board from personal interest. For example, the CEO/Chair duality can permit the CEO to control
information available to other board members. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) document
that firms whose CEOs serve as chair of board are more likely to be subject to SEC accounting
enforcement. Thus, firms separating the CEO and chairman positions are more likely to have
strong internal corporate governance mechanism.

15

3. Hypothesis Development
3.1 New ACM Selection
Prior studies argue that director candidates’ personal attributes and their fit with
incumbent board members are major determinants of director nominations (Olson & Adams,
2004; Withers et al., 2012). If new ACM’s financial reporting attributes could influence
incumbent members’ financial reporting norms and beliefs, it is likely that boards will evaluate
new ACMs’ compatibility with other incumbent members in terms of their financial reporting
attributes.
On one hand, firms could appoint new ACMs with similar financial reporting attributes.
Westphal and Zajac (1995) document a positive association between relatively powerful board
and the board-new-director demographical similarity, suggesting that a powerful board of
directors is more likely to select new directors demographically similar to it. Since new ACMs’
financial reporting attributes might influence firms’ financial reporting culture, I expect
appointer firms to evaluate their financial reporting compatibility with those of new ACMs’. I
propose that firms with high financial reporting quality will appoint strong ACMs to increase the
homogeneity, salience and cohesiveness of committee membership. Homogeneity and
cohesiveness of committee members will enhance communication between them, increase
committee effectiveness, and improve firm financial reporting quality.
Firms with low financial reporting quality could appoint prospective ACMs with weak
financial reporting attributes for at least two reasons. First, there could be an inadequate supply
of qualified directors in the market. According to the survey conducted by Corporate Board
Member & PWC in 2009, more than half of the participating directors indicated that there was a
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shortage of qualified directors for public companies.8 Weak firms could face big challenge in
competing with strong firms for qualified director candidates because weak firms’ high litigation
risk could drive potential qualified directors away from these firms. Second, CEOs in weak firms
may influence the ACM selection and favor candidates with low financial reporting oversight
commitment. Zajac and Westphal (1996) find that CEOs influence the selection process by
avoiding directors inclined to closely monitor management in order to reinforce their relative
powers.9
On the other hand, firms could appoint new ACMs with dissimilar financial reporting
attributes. For firms with high financial reporting quality, they might appoint weak ACMs if their
CEOs are powerful enough to influence the ACM selection by appointing directors permissive of
management discretion. In addition, Strong firms could be indifferent to prospective ACMs’
financial reporting attributes. For example, when firms select candidates to sit in multiple
committees (e.g. compensation committee and audit committee), appointer firms might value
new member’s other complementary expertise and have no preference on his financial reporting
skills. In other words, a weak ACM could be appointed to strong firms if he or she possesses
other expertise that is essential to serve other committees (e.g. compensation committee).
Firms with low financial reporting quality might appoint strong ACMs to improve firm
financial reporting quality. Incumbent directors of weak firms could be exposed to high litigation
and reputation risk because these firms are more likely to have earnings management,
8

https://www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=4205&terms=what+directors+think+2009.
In December 2003, U.S. listing requirements altered the formal involvement of CEOs in the board member
selection process. For example, Exchange regulations require NYSE-listed companies to have a nominating
committee comprising solely independent directors, and the NASDAQ’s and the American Stock Exchange LLC’s
(AMEX) listing provisions require director nominees to be recommended or selected by either a majority of the
independent directors or by a nominating committee comprising solely independent directors. However, powerful
CEOs can potentially affect the selection process to the extent that the nominating committee considers CEOs’
preferences before appointing director candidates (Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, and Scholz 2011).
9
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restatements, and fraud (Cornett et al. 2008; Farber 2005; Abbott et al 2004; Xie et al. 2003). To
lower their risks, incumbent directors can either choose to resign from their positions or improve
firm financial reporting quality. To improve firm financial reporting quality, incumbent directors
can appoint strong ACMs to the board because they can bring in new financial reporting skills
and experience. As boards’ strategy on new ACMs selection is unclear, I state my first
hypothesis in null form:
H1: There is no association between appointer firms’ financial reporting culture and new
ACMs’ financial reporting attributes in the fiscal year prior to the appointments.
3.2 Appointer firm Subsequent FRQ
Audit committees of public companies have a federal regulatory responsibility to ensure
compliance with SEC requirements for financial reporting and disclosure. Any change in audit
committee structure, such as appointment of a new ACM, could result in a change of
committee’s functionality and performance. Prior studies argue that director’s beliefs on earnings
management could be influenced through direct communication of information and interaction
with other director (Chiu et al. 2012). Thus, a newly appointed ACM could also influence
existing ACMs’ financial reporting beliefs and behaviors, which would have some impact on
firms’ subsequent FRQ. For example, firms appointing new ACMs with relatively weak financial
reporting attributes could have decreased subsequent FRQ because incumbent committee
members might change their beliefs in financial reporting oversight and become more passive in
monitoring the management.
In addition, the change in appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ could be related to the
magnitude of difference between appointer firms’ financial reporting culture and new ACMs’
financial reporting attributes. Prior studies argue that homogeneity and cohesiveness of board
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members lead to high levels of satisfaction and commitment to the group and enhance
communication between members, resulting in increased board effectiveness (Westphal and
Zajac 1995; Ingley and Walt 2003). On the contrary, committee heterogeneity might adversely
affect committee effectiveness because it might increase conflict among members, increase
coordination and communication costs. When strong firms appoint relatively weak ACMs, firms
could suffer more deterioration in future FRQ if their financial reporting culture is more different
from new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes. When weak firms appoint strong ACMs, it is
more difficult to predict firms’ future FRQ because the improvement of FRQ through appointing
strong ACMs could be offset by the deterioration of FRQ through increasing the heterogeneity of
the committee. Thus, I predict that:
H2: Appointments of new ACMs with financial reporting attributes different from
appointer firms’ FRQ would have no impact on the change of firms’ subsequent FRQ.
3.3 New non-ACM director Selection
Different from ACMs, whose major responsibility is to ensure firm’s compliance with
SEC requirements for financial reporting and disclosure, non-ACM directors (e.g. nominating
committee

members

and

compensation

committee

members)

have

different

major

responsibilities include CEO selection, succession and compensation; discussing, reviewing and
approving strategic decisions; nominating suitable candidates for election to the board. Thus,
appointer firms need new directors with other skills and expertise to serve in different
committees. In order to satisfy firms’ needs, firms have to give up some candidates with
financial expertise when they select non-ACM directors. In such situations, new candidates’
financial reporting attributes might not be important factor in the selection of non-ACM directors
because appointer firms value new directors’ other expertise more and prefer new directors with
expertise other than financial expertise. Thus, I expect a non-significant association between
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appointer firms’ financial reporting culture and non-ACM directors’ financial reporting
attributes. My third hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows:
H3: There is no association between appointer firms’ financial reporting culture and new
non-ACM directors’ financial reporting attributes in the fiscal year prior to the
appointments.
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4. Research Design
In examining the effect of new ACM’s financial reporting attributes on the new ACM
selection, I use the following ordinary least square (OLS) regression model, using as a dependent
variable the appointer firms’ financial reporting quality (DA_Appointer) in the fiscal year prior to
the new ACM appointments:
DA_Appointer = α1 + α2 DA_Appointee + α3 ACM Characteristics +α4 Appointer firm
Characteristics + α5 Other Controls + α6 Year Dummy Variable + α7 Industry Dummy
Variable + ε

4.1 New ACM Selection
Controlling for new ACM individual characteristics and appointer firm characteristics,
the model investigates the association between the appointer firms’ financial reporting culture
and new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes prior to the new ACM appointments. Using a cross
sectional Jones Model (1991), I measure appointer firms’ FRQ as the discretionary accruals in
the fiscal year prior to the new ACM appointments. The independent variable is the prospective
ACM’s financial reporting attributes (DA_Appointee), which is measured as the appointee firm’s
discretionary accruals in the fiscal year prior to the new ACM appointments.10 As illustrated in
Figure 1, ABC, Inc. appointed Tom, CEO of XYZ, Inc., as the new ACM on April 1, 2009. I
measure both firms’ discretionary accruals in the fiscal year prior to appointment and test the

10

I estimate the abnormal accruals as the residuals of the cross sectional Jones Model (1991) by year and by twodigit SIC industry for all compustat firms. Instead of using absolute abnormal accruals, I use firms’ raw abnormal
accruals level to proxy for firms’ FRQ because: first, many prior studies use raw abnormal accruals to proxy earning
management and they document a negative association between strong corporate governance and abnormal accruals
(Becker et al 1998; Xie et al 2003). Second, firms with same magnitude of abnormal accruals have different level of
litigation risk because firms with high income-increasing accruals are more likely to be sued than those with high
income-decreasing accruals. Thus, similar to auditors, directors of firms with high income-increasing accruals could
have higher litigation and reputation risk and they have more incentives to improve firms’ financial reporting
quality.
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association between DAt-1_Appointer and DAt-1_Appointee. All other control variables are all
measured at fiscal year t-1.
4.2 New ACM Characteristics
The ACM selection could also be determined by the prospective ACMs’ characteristics,
including expertise, prior director experience, age, and gender. To control for ACM expertise, I
use two variables Financial Expertise and Industry Expertise. Xie et al. (2003) document that
board and audit committee members with financial and corporate backgrounds provide better
monitoring of the financial reporting process and reduce firm abnormal accruals. They argue that
a director with corporate or financial expertise is more familiar with the ways that earnings can
be managed. Financial Expertise is defined as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a
new ACM has financial expertise. Appointer firms seek new director with industry expertise
because a director’s industry knowledge and experience enhances monitoring and advising roles.
To control for director industry expertise, I use Industry Expertise, an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if a new ACM comes from a firm in the same industry as the appointer firm.
Gray and Nowland (2013) argue that prior experiences as a director is the most relevant expertise
directors can possess to perform their complex tasks. They find that shareholders value a new
board member’s prior director experience. Thus, appointer firms may also consider candidate’s
director experience in the selection process. To control for director experience, I use
MultipleDirector, which is defined as the number of new ACM’s other directorships. In addition,
prior studies document that age is associated with behavioral tendencies, such as managerial
decision-making style. Taylor (1975) finds that older executives seek more information before
making decisions and take more time in making them. I control for ACM age using Age, defined
as the age of new ACMs in the year prior to the appointment. Finally, several studies find that
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female directors positively affect subsequent firm performance and they argue that female
directors often have diverse and valuable knowledge, information, or skills (Carter et al. 2003;
Erhardt et al. 2003). I control for ACM sex using Female, an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 for female ACM.
4.3 Appointer firms’ Firm-level and Board-level Characteristics
I also control for some appointer firms’ firm-level and board-level characteristics because
they could be associated with both appointer firms’ financial reporting quality and ACM
selection. First, powerful CEOs and CEOs with long tenure have more opportunities and are
more likely to manage earnings and influence the ACM selection. To control for CEOs’
influences, I use Duality_Appointer, an indicator variable takes the value of 1 when CEO is the
chairman of the board in the appointer firm in the year prior to the ACM appointment;
Ceotenure_Appointer, the number of years CEO works for the appointer firm as of the year prior
to the ACM appointment. Second, I control for appointer firm’s board characteristics.
Boardtenure_Appointer is defined as the average number of years that incumbent board
members have served as of the year prior to the ACM appointment. Boardsize_Appionter is
defined as the number of board members in the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment.
Board_Ind%_Appointer is defined as the ratio of the number of independent directors to board
size in the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment. Last, prior studies document that CEOs are
more likely to join boards of large and established firms (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010). I control for
other appointer firm characteristics, including firm size, performance, leverage, operating cash
flows, sales growth, market to book ratio and its auditor.
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4.4 Other Control Variables
If the appointer firm and the appointee firm share a director or executive in the fiscal year
prior to the new ACM appointment, it is possible that this interlocking position has similar
effects on both firms’ financial reporting quality (Chiu et al. 2012). If both the appointer firm and
the appointee firm use the same auditor to audit their financial statements in the year before new
appointments, the auditor may have similar impact to both firms’ FRQ and drive these firms’
FRQ to change in the same direction. To control for these impacts, I include two control
variables in my model. Interlock is defined as an indicator variable takes the value of 1 if a
common director or executive serves both the appointer firm and appointee firm in the fiscal year
prior to the appointment. Sameauditor is defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of 1
if the appointer firm hires the same auditor as the appointee firm in the fiscal year prior to the
appointment and 0 otherwise.
I also control for some appointee firms’ characteristics, including appointee firms’ size
(Size_Appointee) and appointee firms’ performance (ROA_appointee). Size_Aappointee is
defined as the natural log of total assets of the appointee firm in the year prior to the ACM
appointment. ROA_Appointee is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets of the appointee
firm in the year prior to the ACM appointment.
4.5 Change Analysis on Appointer firm Subsequent FRQ
To test my second hypothesis, I perform the following change analysis to investigate the
effects of appointments of ACMs on appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ, controlling for changes
in appointer firms’ characteristics:
Change in DA_Appointer= α1 + α2 Gap+ α3 Negative + α4 Gap *Negative + α5 Change
in Appointer firm Characteristics + α6 Year Dummy Variable + α7 Industry Dummy
Variable + ε
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The dependent variable is the change in appointer firms’ discretionary accruals (Change
in DA_Appointer), defined as the change in appointer firms’ discretionary accruals between
fiscal year prior to (Year t-1) and fiscal year subsequent to (Year t+1) the appointment year
(Year t). As illustrated in Figure 2 Part A, the change in ABC, Inc.’s discretionary accruals is
calculated using its discretionary accruals in fiscal year 2010 to deduct that in fiscal year 2008.
The test independent variable, Gap, is defined as the difference between appointer firm's rank of
discretionary accruals and appointee firm's rank of discretionary accruals. I first rank all
Compustat firms’ discretionary accruals by year and industry from 1 to 10.11 Then, I subtract
appointee firm's rank from appointer firm’s rank to obtain the variable Gap. The distribution of
the variable Gap is presented in Figure 2 Part B. The value of Gap ranges from -9 to 8, with
about 58.6% of the observations distributing within -2 to 2. This distribution suggests that more
than half of the appointer firms are more likely to appoint new ACMs with financial reporting
attributes relatively similar to their financial reporting culture. Here, I define firms with negative
(positive) Gap value as appointer firms with stronger (weaker) FRQ relative to appointee firms
in the year prior to the appointment. The variable Negative is defined as an indicator variable
which takes the value of 1 if the value of Gap variable is negative, and 0 otherwise. Other control
variables are also measured as changes from Year t-1 to Year t+1.

11

Firms at the top decile with lowest discretionary accruals are assigned value of 1. Firms at the bottom decile with
highest discretionary accruals are assigned value of 10.
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5. Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 Sample Selection
I use several different databases to construct my sample. The ACM appointments and the
board data come from Directorship Files of GMI ratings database from the period 2007 to
2011.12 I obtain the accounting data from Compustat, executive information from Execucomp
and analyst forecast data from IBES. Definitions of the variables are in Appendix A.
My paper focuses only on new appointments of active executive ACMs for the following
reasons: first, corporate executives (e.g. CEOs, CFOs) are regarded as valuable outside directors
with unique expertise and business experiences, capable of monitoring and advising the
management in a way that other outside directors are not able to do (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010).
Second, corporate executives create the “tone of the top” in their firms and they have direct and
influential links to firms’ corporate governance and reporting policy. Last, since it is difficult to
specifically quantify an ACM’s beliefs in financial reporting, I use the appointee firm’s FRQ as
the proxy. This requires the ACM appointment observations to have public financial information
in the years before and after the appointments. Non-executive ACMs (e.g. accountants, lawyers,
and professors) come from firms without publicly financial information to measure their
financial reporting attributes. The retired executives ACMs had retired from the appointee firms
at the time of the appointments, thus they might not have influence on appointee firm’s
operations and reporting policy.
Table 1 presents the sample selection for new ACM appointments sample. I construct the
initial sample of new ACM appointments from the GMI ratings database for Russell 3000 firms
12

GMI Ratings offers access to annual corporate governance datasets from 2001 through 2012. GMI Ratings covers
Russell 3000 firms starting year 2006 to 2012. I restrict my sample period of ACM appointments from 2007 to 2011
because I need director data one year ahead of the appointments for the ACM selection model and one year after the
sample period for the change analysis.
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and identify 1,361 new ACM appointments.13 I hand collect these new ACMs’ information from
proxy statements. I identify the appointee firms these new ACMs worked for at the fiscal year
prior to the appointments and their primary positions at the appointee firms. I drop 31
observations due to missing information in the proxy statements. Since I focus only on
appointments of new active executive ACMs, I drop 361 observations and 122 observations for
non-executive and retired executive ACM appointments, respectively.14 Last, I drop 239
observations and 333 observations due to missing financial data in the Compustat files for
appointer firms and appointee firms, respectively. My final sample consists of 275 observations
of new active executive ACM appointments from 2007 to 2011.
I use the same GMI ratings database from the period 2007 to 2011 to construct the
sample of new non-ACM appointments for my third hypothesis. I perform the same procedures
to hand collect new director information for my non-ACM directors. The sample consists of all
new appointments of executive directors who do not serve the audit committees.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in my regression analyses. The
means of DA_Appointer and DA_Appointee are 0.002 and 0.032 and they are significantly
different, which suggests that appointer firms have significantly lower discretionary accruals
than appointee firms in the fiscal year prior to the appointments.

13

I define a new ACM appointment to take place when the appointment is publicly announced for the first time but
not on the proxy statement date. Since some directors can be appointed any time during the interim period, it is more
accurate to measure appointer firms’ FRQ and new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes using the announcement
dates, which is closer to the appointment decision. I hand-collected the appointment dates for new ACM
appointments from LexisNexis and their public filings (e.g. 8-Ks filings and proxy statements).
14
Active executive ACMs appointments include all new ACMs currently work at executive positions in the
appointee firms. For example, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Vice president, Senior Vice
president etc. This is to ensure that the executive ACMs actively participate in the appointee firms’ operations and
they could have direct influences on appointee firms’ corporate governance and financial reporting. The nonexecutive ACMs do not serve as executives in a public company and their primary positions include lawyers, public
accountants, professors, and consultants etc.
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I also provide descriptive statistics for appointer and appointee firms’ financial and
corporate governance characteristics. For appointee firms, the means of Size_Appointee and
ROA_Appointee are about 8.63 and 0.04 respectively. For appointer firms, the means of
Size_Appointer and ROA_Appointer are 7.71 and 0.003 respectively. The appointee firms are
larger and have higher performance than the appointer firms. Appointer firms’ average leverage
is 21 percent, average operating cash flow to assets is 8 percent, and average sales growth is 16.6
percent. Finally, the market-to-book ratio is 2.36. In the year prior to ACM appointments,
appointer firms’ boards on average have 9.34 members. These members on average serve in the
firms for about 7.52 years and 75 percent of them are independent directors to the firms. The
CEOs of appointer firms on average serve the firms for about 5.44 years and 50.9 percent of
them also serve as the chairman of the board.
Finally, I provide descriptive statistics for the new ACMs and other variables. The new
ACMs on average are 53.3 years old and serve only 1.59 other directorship in other firms.
Thirteen percent of the new ACMs are female directors. About twenty-two percent of new
ACMs come from firms in the same industry as the appointer firms and seven percent of them
have the financial expertise. About two percent of observations have interlocking director or
executive serving both the appointer firms and appointee firms before appointments. Twentyfour percent of the appointer firms hire the same auditor as the appointee firms in the fiscal year
prior to the appointments.
Table 3 Panel A presents the distribution of new ACM appointments by year. The
appointment of active new executive ACMs accounts for about 20 percent every year. Year 2008
and Year 2011 have the highest appointments of 63 and 64 ACMs, which takes up 46 percent of
all appointments.
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Table 4 presents the Pearson (Spearman) pair-wise correlations below (above) the
diagonal among all the variables. The correlation coefficients are indicated in bold if the
correlation are significant at 5% level (p<0.05). In general, the appointer firms’ discretionary
accruals are positively correlated with their firm characteristics (for example, Size and ROA) and
appointee firms’ discretionary accruals. Appointer firms’ firm size and ROA are also positively
associated with appointee firms’ firm size and ROA.
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6. Main Results
6.1 Effect of New ACM's financial reporting attributes on ACM Selection
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS regression for my Hypothesis 1. The coefficient
on my test variable, DA_Appointee, is 0.2 and is significant at 5% level in the Model (1). After
controlling for appointer firms’ characteristics and AMCs’ individual characteristics, the
coefficient of DA_Appointee is 0.18 and it is significant at 5% level. These positive significant
coefficients provide evidence that appointer firms’ discretionary accruals are positively
associated with appointee firms’ discretionary accruals in the fiscal year prior to the ACM
appointments. After controlling for these correlated variables, this positive association is likely to
be driven by the appointer firms’ selection decisions on new ACMs. For example, strong
appointer firms prefer appointing ACM candidates with strong financial reporting attributes,
possibly because they would like to maintain high levels of FRQ. Thus, the results suggest that
appointer firms are more likely to strategically appoint new ACMs with financial reporting
attributes similar to their firms’ financial reporting culture. The appointer firms’ discretionary
accruals are positively related to their return on assets and negatively related to their operating
cash flow. Further, the coefficients on Female, Financial_expertise and ROA_Appointee are
significantly negative, which suggest that appointer firms with lower discretionary accruals are
more likely to appoint female ACMs, ACMs with financial expertise and ACMs from appointee
firms with high performance.
6.2 Change Analysis on Appointer firm Subsequent FRQ
Table 6 presents the results of the univariate test on change of appointer firms’
subsequent FRQ. The dependent variable, Change in DA_Appointer, is defined as the change in
appointer firms’ abnormal accruals between the fiscal year prior to (Yt-1) and the fiscal year
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subsequent to (Yt+1) the appointment year (Yt). Mean of Change in DA_Appointer for strong
firms appointing relatively weak ACMs (Gap <0) is 0.06. Mean of Change in DA_Appointer for
weak firms appointing relatively strong ACMs (Gap >0) is -0.022. For firms appointing ACMs
with similar financial reporting attributes (Gap =0), their mean of Change in DA_Appointer is
0.0005.15 The univariate results provide some evidences that firms appointing ACMs with
similar financial reporting attributes have almost no change in firms’ subsequent FRQ. However,
firms appointing ACMs with dissimilar financial reporting attributes are more likely to have
some changes on their subsequent FRQ. For example, the FRQ of strong firms appointing
relatively weak ACMs would decrease subsequent to the appointments. The FRQ of weak firms
appointing relatively strong ACMs would increase subsequent to the appointments. These results
suggest that it is critical important for appointer firms to select new ACMs because ACMs’
financial reporting attributes could have a big impact on firms’ FRQ.
Table 7 presents the results of the multivariate test on the change of appointer firms’
subsequent FRQ for my Hypothesis 2. In both models, I use Change in DA_Appointer as the
dependent variable to investigate how appointments of new ACMs may impact the appointer
firms’ subsequent FRQ. In model 1, the coefficient on Gap is -0.0077 and it is significant at 1%
level. The results are consistent with results in table 6. It shows that the appointments of new
ACMs with financial reporting attributes different from firm’s financial reporting culture would
have an inverse impact on appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ. For example, strong (weak) firms
appointing relatively weak (strong) ACMs would have decreased (increased) subsequent FRQ.

15

I perform a one-way ANOVA analysis on the mean for these three groups of change in discretionary accruals and
the results suggest the mean differs significantly among the groups. I also perform two sample t-test for each of the
two groups and find that the mean of strong firms appointing weak ACMs is significantly greater than those of firms
appointing similar ACMs and weak firms appointing strong ACMs. However, the mean of weak firms appointing
strong ACMs is not significantly different from that of firms appointing similar ACMs.
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In model 2, I further investigate how appointments of different new ACMs impact
appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ. I include an indicator variable Negative and the interaction
term of Gap and Negative in the model. The coefficient on Gap is 0.0062 and the coefficient on
Negative is -0.042. Both coefficients are not significant. The coefficient on their interaction term
is -0.0358 and it is significant at the 1% level after controlling for changes of appointer firms’
firm-level and board-level characteristics. The results provide evidence that comparing to other
appointments, strong firms appointing relatively weak ACMs would subsequently have
significant lower FRQ. The result suggests that appointing an ACM with weak financial
reporting attributes is more likely to lower the appointer firm’s FRQ. The significant coefficient
of the interaction term also provide evidence that when the difference/gap between strong firms’
financial reporting culture and weak ACMs’ financial reporting attributes increases (Gap takes
value from -1 to -9), the impact of deterioration on appointer firms’ FRQ increases (discretionary
accruals changes from 0.035 to 0.32). This suggests that firms appointing ACMs with relatively
weak financial reporting attributes suffer more deterioration on their subsequent financial
reporting quality when their financial reporting culture are more different from the ACMs’
financial reporting attributes.
The coefficients on Size_ATF_change and CFO_ATF_change are significantly negative,
suggesting that change of firm size and operating cash flow are negatively associated with the
change in firm’s abnormal accruals. Further, the appointer firms’ changes in ROA and leverage
are positively associated with the change in firm’s abnormal accruals. Last, change of CEO
tenure is negatively associated with change in firm’s abnormal accruals.
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6.3 Selection of non-ACM director appointments
Table 8 presents the results of the OLS regression for my Hypothesis 3. I use the same
research model to test the effect of new directors’ financial reporting attributes on the selection
of non-ACM director appointments. The coefficient on my test variable, DA_Appointee, is 0.049
in the Model (1). After controlling for appointer firms’ characteristics and AMCs’ individual
characteristics, the coefficient of DA_Appointee is 0.0264 in model (2). In both models, the test
independent variable is not significantly associated with the dependent variable.

This

insignificant association provides evidence that appointer firms’ discretionary accruals are not
associated with appointee firms’ discretionary accruals in the fiscal year prior to the non-ACM
director appointments. The results suggest that appointer firms might not prefer selecting new
non-ACM directors with financial reporting attributes similar to their financial reporting culture
as they do in selecting new ACMs. Appointer firms could value new directors’ other skills and
expertise more because these skills are more important and more useful than their financial
reporting attributes in serving the board.
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7. Additional Analyses
The Jones discretionary Model (1991) has an implicit assumption that revenues are
nondiscretionary. In situations when revenue is manipulated, the Jones Model will remove some
of the manipulated earnings from the discretionary accrual measure which will cause the
estimate of earnings management to be biased (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). In this
section, I re-examine the ACM selection model of my Hypothesis one using different financial
quality measures used in prior literatures.
7.1 Robustness tests of ACM selection using other discretionary accruals measures
First, following Dechow et al. (1995), I modify the Jones Model to exclude growth in
credit sales to mitigate the measurement misspecification of discretionary accruals in Jones
Model when discretion is exercised over revenues. Specifically, I adjust the original Jones Model
(1991) by subtracting the change in account receivables from the change in revenue. Using the
modified Jones Model, I measure appointer firms’ FRQ as the abnormal accruals in the fiscal
year prior to the new ACM appointments. New ACM’s financial reporting attribute is measured
as the appointee firm’s abnormal accruals. In Table 9 Model 1, the coefficient of test
independent variable is 0.15 and is significant at 10% level. The results suggest that appointer
firms are more likely to strategically appoint new ACMs with financial reporting attributes
similar to their firms’ financial reporting culture.
Second, prior studies argue that the correlation between performance and the residuals
from the Jones model and modified Jones model could be a concern in tests of earnings
management when samples experience extreme performance (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005;
Dechow et al. 2010). Kothari et al. (2005) suggest controlling for the normal level of accruals
conditional on ROA. They control for the impact of performance on estimated abnormal accrual
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using a performance-matched firm’s discretionary accrual. Following Kothari et al. (2005), I
identify a firm from the same industry and same year with the closest past year ROA to that of
the sample firm. I deduct the control firm’s abnormal accruals from those of the sample firm to
generate performance match abnormal accruals. 16 Alternatively, Kothari et al. (2005) control for
performance on abnormal accruals using a linear regression with ROA included in the Jones
model as an additional regressor. I also estimate the abnormal accruals of my sample firms using
the cross-sectional Jones model with current year ROA included in the model. The results are
presented on model 2 and model 3 in Table 9. Both models present a positively significant
association between appointer firms’ discretionary accruals and appointee firms’ discretionary
accruals in the fiscal years prior to the appointments. The results are robust when I control for the
normal level of accruals conditional on ROA.
Third, to mitigate the concern on lack of comparability of abnormal accruals between two
firms from two different industries in the process of selecting new ACMs, I also run the same
regression of ACM selection using the industry-adjusted abnormal accruals estimated from the
Jones model. The assumption is, after the abnormal accruals are adjusted for the industry mean,
the impact of industry on firms’ abnormal accruals is identical for both the appointer firm and the
appointee firm. The results in Table 9 model 4 provide same evidences that appointer firms’
discretionary accruals are positively associated with appointee firms’ discretionary accruals in
the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointments.
Last, prior studies argue that extreme accruals need to be reversed in the future periods
because they are more likely to contain estimation error (Dechow and Dichev 2002). An
estimation error happens when future cash flow realization differs from managers’ accruals
estimate. The error will be corrected by posting an entry to reverse accruals. Thus, firms with
16

I use the cross sectional Jones Model to estimate the abnormal accruals for all the firms.
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extreme accruals are more likely to reverse their accruals in the future. To mitigate the concern
that firms might have large accruals reversal in the years of appointments, I construct a threeyear average of abnormal accruals prior to the appointments to measure firms’ financial
reporting quality. In table 9 model 5, the dependent (independent) variable is the appointer
(appointee) firms' three-year average of abnormal accruals prior to the appointments. The
coefficient of test independent variable is 0.196 and is significant at 5% level. The results
suggest that appointer firms are more likely to strategically appoint new ACMs with financial
reporting attributes similar to their firms’ financial reporting culture.
7.2 Robustness tests of ACM selection using other financial reporting quality measures
Prior studies have used various measures as indicators of financial reporting quality
including abnormal accruals, small positive earnings and negative earnings surprises avoidance
(Jones 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 2011). Many prior
studies have debated the strengths and weaknesses of all these measures and their findings on
some of these measures are mixed.
Table 10 presents the results of my additional analyses using the negative earnings
surprises avoidance and the small positive earnings as the dependent variable. In model 1, I
calculate the percentage of fiscal quarters in the year prior to the ACM appointments for both
appointer firms and appointee firms that beat the analyst consensus forecasts by three cents per
share or less. The dependent (independent) variable MoB%_Appointer (MoB%_Appointee) is
defined as the percentage of quarters the appointer (appointee) firms beat the analyst consensus
forecasts by three cents per share or less. The coefficient on MoB%_Appointer is 0.138 and is
significant at 10% level after controlling for other variables. Using the negative earnings
surprises avoidance as the FRQ measure, I still have the robust results that appointer firms are
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more likely to appoint new ACMs with financial reporting attributes similar to their firms’
financial reporting culture.
In model 2, the dependent variable LossAvoid_Appointer is an indicator variable which
takes the value of 1 if the appointer firm has earnings between 0 and 1 cent in the fiscal year
prior to the appointment. After controlling for other variables, the coefficient on
LossAvoid_Appintee is positively significant at 5% level. The positive association suggests that
appointer firms’ FRQ is positively associated with appointee firms’ FRQ in the fiscal year prior
to the new ACM appointments. Thus, the results are robust to usage of small positive earnings as
the FRQ measure.
7.3 Robustness tests of non-ACM director appointments using other financial reporting quality
measures
In this section, I test whether appointer firms value new non-ACM directors’ financial
reporting attributes in the director selection process using other financial reporting quality
measures. Table 11 presents the results of my additional analyses using the negative earnings
surprises avoidance and the small positive earnings as the dependent variable. In both models,
the test independent variable is negative and it is not significantly associated with the dependent
variable. The results are consistent with those using discretionary accruals measure in table 8.
The results suggest that non-ACM director’s financial reporting attributes are not important
determinants of the non-ACM director selection. Appointer firms do not require new non-ACM
directors to have financial reporting attributes similar to their firm’s financial reporting culture.
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8. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of prospective ACMs’ financial
reporting attributes on the new ACM selection. Using appointee firm’s FRQ as a proxy for new
ACMs’ financial reporting attributes, I find that appointer firms select new ACMs with financial
reporting attributes similar to their financial reporting culture. The results suggest that new
ACM’s financial reporting attributes are important determinants of ACM selection because new
ACM’s financial reporting attributes influence incumbent members’ commitments and
performance, and appointer firm’s financial reporting quality.
In addition, I investigate how the appointments of new ACMs affect appointer firms’
subsequent financial reporting quality. I document that appointer firms’ subsequent FRQ is
affected by the new ACMs’ financial reporting attributes. Firms appointing relatively weak
ACMs would have decreased subsequent FRQ, while firms appointing relatively strong ACMs
would have increased subsequent FRQ. I also find that strong firms appointing relatively weak
ACMs have significant lower subsequent FRQ than other firms. In addition, I find that firms
appointing ACMs with relatively weak financial reporting attributes suffer more deterioration on
their subsequent financial reporting quality when their financial reporting culture are more
different from the ACMs’ financial reporting attributes.
Finally, I examine the effect of new non-ACMs’ financial reporting attributes on the
selection of non-ACM directors. I find no significant positive association between non-ACM
director’s financial reporting attributes and appointer firms’ FRQ in the fiscal year prior to the
appointments. The results suggest that appointer firms do not prefer selecting new non-ACM
directors with financial reporting attributes similar to their firms’ financial reporting culture.
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Figure 1. An example of New Audit Committee Member Selection
Company ABC, Inc. appointed Tom, CEO of XYZ, Inc., as ACM on 4/1/2009
Fiscal Year t-1
12/31/2008

New ACM Appointment
4/1/2009

Fiscal Year t
12/31/2009

Appointer Firm ( ABC, Inc.)

DAt-1_Appointer
Appointee Firm (XYZ, Inc.)

DAt-1_Appointee

Fiscal Year t-1
12/31/2008
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Fiscal Year t
12/31/2009

Figure 2. Change Analysis on Appointer firms' subsequent FRQ
Part A. Example of change analysis on ABC, Inc.

Fiscal Year t-1 New ACM Appointment
12/31/2008
4/1/2009

Fiscal Year t
12/31/2009

Fiscal Year t +1
12/31/2010

Appointer Firm ( ABC, Inc.)

DAt-1_Appointer

DAt+1_Appointer

Part B. Distribution of the variable Difference
Difference
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Observation
1
3
1
8
16
15
23
32
28
39
31
31
19
11
6
6
4
1

Percentage
0.36%
1.09%
0.36%
2.91%
5.82%
5.45%
8.36%
11.64%
10.18%
14.18%
11.27%
11.27%
6.91%
4.00%
2.18%
2.18%
1.45%
0.36%

275

100%

Notes: Variable Difference is defined as the difference between appointer firm's rank of discretionary accruals and appointee firm's
rank of discretionary accruals. I first rank all Compustat firms’ discretionary accruals by year and industry from 1 to 10. Then, I subtract
appointee firm's rank from appointer firm’s rank to obtain the variable Difference.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Description
Total new outside ACM appointments from GMI Ratings Database (2007-2011)
Less observations without director information in the proxy statement
Less observations of retired executive ACM appointments
Less observations of non-executive ACM appointments
Less observations missing financial data in Compustat for appointer firms
Less observations missing financial data in Compustat for appointee firms
Final sample of new executive ACM appointments

# of observations
1,361
(31)
(122)
(361)
(239)
(333)
275

Notes: Table 1 presents the sample selection for new audit committee member ("ACM") appointments
sample. The initial sample includes 1,361 new ACM appointments from Directorship Files of GMI ratings
database for Russell 3000 firms from 2007 to 2011. I hand collect the information about these new
ACMs in the proxy statements to identify their appointee firms and their primary positions. Since my
paper focuses on appointments of active executive ACMs, I exclude observations of retired executive
and non-executive ACM appointments. I also drop observations missing financial data in Compustat for
the appointer and appointee firms. My final sample consists of 275 observations of new executive ACM
appointments.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dependent Variables
DA_Appointer

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

P25

P50

P75

275

0.002

0.174

-0.033

0.011

0.067

Test Variables
Appointee Firms:
DA_Appointee
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee

275
275
275

0.032
8.631
0.041

0.119
2.071
0.130

-0.022
7.296
0.023

0.021
8.668
0.055

0.074
10.031
0.094

Appointer Firms:
Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
Big4_Appointer

275
275
275
275
275
275
275
275
275
275
275
275

7.711
0.003
2.355
0.207
0.078
0.166
0.509
9.338
7.515
0.746
5.444
0.935

1.905
0.159
4.888
0.219
0.128
0.665
0.501
2.357
3.816
0.138
5.580
0.248

6.198
-0.013
1.391
0.036
0.036
-0.019
0.000
8.000
5.143
0.667
2.000
1.000

7.766
0.039
2.181
0.178
0.091
0.075
1.000
9.000
7.000
0.778
4.000
1.000

9.078
0.076
3.851
0.297
0.138
0.191
1.000
11.000
9.333
0.857
7.000
1.000

275
275
275
275
275
275
275

1.589
53.287
0.135
0.018
0.240
0.218
0.076

0.825
6.818
0.342
0.134
0.428
0.414
0.266

1.000
49.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
53.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

2.000
58.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

New ACM:

MultipleDirector
Age
Female

Interlocked
Sameauditor

Ind_expertise
Financial_expertise
Notes: All variables are defined and calculated in the fiscal year prior to ACM appointments. All
firm financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations.
Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions.
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Table 3
Analysis on New ACM Appointments

Distribution of new executive ACM appointments by year
Appointing Year

# of observations

Percentage

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

51
63
46
51
64

19%
23%
17%
19%
23%

Total

275

100%

43

Table 4
Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal among variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

DA_Appointer
DA_Appointee
Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
Interlocked

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1.00 0.11 0.14 0.36 0.03 0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.03
0.14 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.04 0.24 -0.02 -0.08
0.16 -0.03 1.00 0.26 -0.10 0.38 0.15 -0.13 0.20 0.70 0.11 0.33 -0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.06 0.01 -0.25 0.12 0.47 0.05 0.36 0.00
0.43 0.11 0.32 1.00 0.32 -0.07 0.64 0.19 0.09 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04
-0.03 -0.02 -0.11 0.04 1.00 -0.15 0.33 0.24 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02
0.00 -0.13 0.22 -0.04 -0.30 1.00 -0.06 -0.10 0.13 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.21 -0.07 0.16 0.05
-0.10 0.07 0.25 0.64 0.03 -0.01 1.00 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.20 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.11 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03
0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.08 1.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.15 0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.06
0.05 0.03 0.21 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.02 1.00 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.43 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.07
0.17 -0.06 0.69 0.28 -0.06 0.13 0.20 -0.04 0.13 1.00 0.16 0.22 -0.06 -0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 0.02 0.35 0.06 0.32 -0.01
0.07 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.00 -0.03 0.19 -0.11 0.05 0.07 1.00 0.04 0.26 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.04
0.11 0.05 0.27 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.14 0.17 -0.04 1.00 -0.16 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.11 -0.07
0.05 0.07 -0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.32 -0.08 0.35 -0.14 1.00 0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.04 0.14
0.04 -0.13 -0.05 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 1.00 0.05 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.01
MultipleDirector
0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.06 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.07 1.00 0.33 -0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.04
Age
0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 0.30 1.00 -0.16 -0.03 0.11 0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.03
Female
-0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.06 -0.15 1.00 0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.05
Ind_expertise
0.01 0.06 -0.25 -0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.16 0.11 -0.03 -0.15 -0.10 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.02 1.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Financial_expertise
-0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.08 0.06
Size_Appointee
0.08 -0.01 0.50 0.15 -0.09 0.15 0.13 -0.01 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.14 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.10 -0.10 -0.05 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.02
ROA_Appointee
0.02 0.28 0.17 0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.27 1.00 0.08 0.05
Big4_Appointer
0.04 -0.05 0.37 0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.15 0.10 1.00 0.11
Sameauditor
0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.11 1.00
Notes: All variables are defined and calculated in the fiscal year just prior to ACM appointments. All firm financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with
outlier observations. Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. The correlation coefficients in bold are significant at p<0.05.

Table 5
Effects of New ACMs' Financial Reporting attributes on ACM Selections
Dependent Variable:
DA_Appointer

(1)
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
Coefficients t-Statistics

Test Variable:

DA_Appointee
Control Variables:
Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
MultipleDirector
Age
Female
Ind_expertise
Financial_expertise
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee
Big4_Appointer
Interlocked
Sameauditor
Intercept
INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations

2.29 **

0.2001

-0.0038

-0.36

0.1855

0.0063
0.9050
-0.0004
0.0131
-0.7486
-0.0217
-0.0200
0.0038
-0.0008
0.0937
0.0017
-0.0128
0.0011
-0.0461
-0.0155
-0.0705
-0.0015
-0.1316
-0.0426
0.0803
0.0241
-0.1679

2.34 **

0.73
12.32
-0.25
0.27
-8.30
-1.50
-1.05
0.65
-0.32
1.35
0.87
-1.13
0.80
-1.80
-0.69
-2.01
-0.30
-1.80
-1.05
1.24
1.14
-1.00

***

***

*
**
*

YES
YES
275

NO
NO

275

2

R
0.02
0.63
Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates from the ordinary least square ("OLS") regression of
new ACM appointments. The dependent variable is appointer firms' abnormal accruals in the fiscal year
just prior to the ACM appointment. The test independent variable is appointee firms' abnormal accruals
in the year prior to the appointments. All firm financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail
to deal with outlier observations. Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *, **, and ***
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 6
Univariate Test of Change on Appointer Firms' Subsequent FRQ

Change in DA_Appointer
Gap <0
Gap =0
Gap >0
Total

Observations
116
35
97

Mean
0.06143
0.000454
-0.02158

Std. Dev.
0.183765
0.101866
0.136106

248

Notes: This table presents the results of the univariate test on change of appointer
firms’ subsequent FRQ. The dependent variable, Change in DA_Appointer, is
defined as the change in appointer firms’ abnormal accruals between the fiscal
year prior to (Yt-1) and the fiscal year subsequent to (Yt+1) the appointment year
(Yt). Gap is defined as the difference between appointer firm's rank of
discretionary accruals and appointee firm's rank of discretionary accruals. Gap is
smaller than 0 when strong firms appoint relatively weak ACMs. Gap equals to 0
when firms appoint similar ACMs. Gap is larger than 0 when weak firms appoint
relatively strong ACMs.
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Table 7
Change Analysis on Appointer Firms' Subsequent FRQ
Dependent Variables:
Change in DA_Appointer
Test Variable:
Gap
Negative
Gap*Negative
Control Variables:
Size_ATF_change
ROA_ATF_change
MTB_ATF_change
CFO_ATF_change
Leverage_ATF_change
Salegrowth_ATF_change
Duality_ATF_change
Boardsize_ATF_change
Board_Ind%_ATF_change
Boardtenure_ATF_change
Ceotenure_ATF_change
Intercept

INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations
2

R

(1)
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
Coefficients t-Statistics

-0.0077

-2.75 ***

0.0062
-0.0423
-0.0358

1.08
-1.45
-3.83 ***

-0.0740
0.6236
-0.0005
-0.6688
0.2337
-0.0336
0.0259
0.0001
0.0204
0.0018
-0.0025
-0.0803

-2.76
12.82
-0.43
-8.90
2.71
-1.61
1.24
0.02
0.38
0.40
-0.94
-0.69

-0.0670
0.6236
-0.0008
-0.7308
0.2201
-0.0235
0.0382
-0.0011
0.0413
0.0011
-0.0044
-0.0811

-2.57
13.26
-0.67
-9.80
2.63
-1.16
1.86
-0.20
0.80
0.26
-1.67
-0.72

***
***
***
***

YES
YES
248

YES
YES
248

0.65

0.68

***
***
***
***
*

*

Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates for the change analysis on appointer firms'
subsequent financial reporting quality ("FRQ"). The dependent variable, Change in DA_Appointer, is
defined as the change in appointer firms’ abnormal accruals between fiscal year prior to (Yt-1) and
fiscal year subsequent to (Yt+1) the appointment year (Yt). The test variables are Gap, Negative and
their interaction term Gap*Negative. Gap is defined as the difference between appointer firm's rank of
discretionary accruals and appointee firm's rank of discretionary accruals. Negative is defined as an
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the difference between appointer firm's rank of
discretionary accruals and appointee firm's rank of discretionary accrual is negative , and 0 otherwise.
All firm financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations.
Please see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
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Table 8
Selection of new non-ACM Directors

Dependent Variable :

(1)
DA_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
DA_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

Test Variable:

DA_Appointee

0.0490

1.35

0.0264

0.78

-0.0061
0.8261
0.0004
0.0428
-0.6863
0.0056
-0.0027
0.0002
0.0034
-0.0196
0.0008
0.0006
-0.0011
-0.0068
-0.0015
0.0018
-0.0057
-0.0613
-0.0060
0.1658

-1.48
12.68
0.60
1.29
-8.92
0.27
-0.28
0.10
2.30
-0.52
0.84
0.11
-1.44
-0.53
-0.13
0.63
-0.14
-2.56
-0.59
1.64

Control Variables:

Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
MultipleDirector
Age
Female
Ind_expertise
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee
Big4_Appointer
Sameauditor
Intercept
INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations

0.0238

4.06 ***

***

***

**

**

YES
YES
413

NO
NO

413

2

R
0.00
0.63
Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates from the ordinary least square ("OLS")
regression of new non-ACM director appointments. The dependent variable is appointer firms'
abnormal accruals in the fiscal year just prior to the non-ACM appointment. The test independent
variable is appointee firms' abnormal accruals in the year prior to the appointments. All firm
financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please
see Appendix A for the variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
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Table 9
Selection of new ACM - Other Discretionary Accrual Measures
(1)
Dependent Variable:

DA_Appointer

Modified-Jones Model
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
Jones Model
Performance Matched
Coefficients t-Statistics

(3)
Jones Model
ROA_Included
Coefficients t-Statistics

(4)
Jones Model
Industry Adjusted
Coefficients t-Statistics

(5)
Jones Model
Three-Year Average
Coefficients t-Statistics

Test Variable:

DA_Appointee
DA_Appointee
DA_Appointee
DA_Appointee
DA_Appointee

0.1526

1.71 *
0.1747

2.10 **
0.1583

1.86 *
0.1606

1.98 **
0.1969

Control Variables:
Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
MultipleDirector
Age
Female
Ind_expertise
Financial_expertise
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee
Big4_Appointer
Interlocked
Sameauditor
Intercept

0.0129
0.9122
0.0003
0.0251
-0.7500
-0.0368
-0.0251
0.0030
-0.0012
0.1181
0.0021
-0.0120
0.0016
-0.0527
-0.0105
-0.0818
-0.0024
-0.1286
-0.0391
0.0788
0.0224
-0.2841

INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations

YES
YES
252

1.32
11.25
0.15
0.47
-7.60
-2.09
-1.18
0.46
-0.43
1.53
1.00
-0.95
1.00
-1.83
-0.42
-2.08
-0.42
-1.58
-0.87
1.04
0.94
-1.54

-0.0070
1.2393
-0.0090
0.1051
*** -0.8687
**
0.0316
0.0222
-0.0066
-0.0044
0.1082
-0.0017
-0.0063
0.0027
*
-0.0612
0.0324
** -0.1606
-0.0099
-0.0193
0.0589
0.1107
-0.0066
-0.3629
***

-0.39
8.42
-2.51
1.05
-4.76
0.96
0.57
-0.54
-0.83
0.71
-0.44
-0.26
0.93
-1.13
0.72
-2.19
-0.91
-0.14
0.69
0.87
-0.15
-1.05

***
**
***

**

YES
YES
253

0.0081
0.5990
0.0012
0.0153
-0.6365
0.0008
-0.0162
0.0001
-0.0008
0.0761
0.0023
-0.0062
0.0006
-0.0437
0.0021
-0.0786
0.0004
-0.1352
-0.0394
0.0550
0.0205
-0.0313
YES
YES
275

2

1.04
9.06
0.73
0.36
-7.92
0.06
-0.95
0.01
-0.32
1.23
1.34
-0.61
0.46
-1.91
0.11
-2.52
0.09
-2.21
-1.09
0.96
1.09
-0.21

0.0024
0.9043
-0.0008
0.0151
*** -0.7504
-0.0231
-0.0127
0.0046
-0.0011
0.0986
0.0015
-0.0139
0.0010
*
-0.0434
-0.0207
** -0.0622
-0.0012
** -0.1185
-0.0534
0.0727
0.0228
-0.1153
***

YES
YES
275

0.26
0.0112
11.87 *** 0.4065
-0.41
0.0002
0.30
-0.0037
-8.03 *** -0.2412
-1.55
-0.0075
-0.64
0.0072
0.77
0.0016
-0.42
0.0027
1.37
0.1326
0.76
0.0012
-1.18
-0.0046
0.66
0.0007
-1.63
-0.0230
-0.89
-0.0004
-1.71 *
-0.0836
-0.23
-0.0031
-1.56
-0.1216
-1.27
-0.0786
1.08
0.0724
1.04
0.0184
-0.66
-0.2986

2.10 **

1.33
5.76
0.10
-0.08
-2.78
-0.54
0.39
0.30
1.05
1.99
0.66
-0.43
0.49
-0.94
-0.02
-2.48
-0.62
-1.76
-2.01
1.17
0.91
-1.85

YES
YES
275

R
0.63
0.49
0.54
0.62
0.54
Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates from the OLS regression of new ACM appointments using different discretionary accrual measures. In the first four
models, the dependent variable is defined as appointer firms' abnormal accruals in the fiscal year just prior to the ACM appointment. The test independent variable is
appointee firms' abnormal accruals in the year prior to the appointments. In Model 5, the dependent (independent) variable is the appointer (appointee) firms' three-year
average of abnormal accruals prior to the appointments. All firm financial variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please see
Appendix A for the variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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***

***

**

**
*
*

*

Table 10
Selection of new ACM - Other Financial Reporting Quality Measures

Dependent Variable:

(1)
MoB%_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
LossAvoid_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

Test Variable:

MoB%_Appointee
LossAvoid_Appointee

0.1386

1.79 *
0.1609

2.23 **

Control Variables:

Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
Interlocked
MultipleDirector
Age
Female
Ind_expertise
Financial_expertise
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee
Big4_Appointer
Sameauditor
Intercept

-0.0530
-0.2898
0.0049
-0.1349
0.3776
-0.0098
0.0048
0.0243
0.0002
0.0796
-0.0018
0.1233
0.0176
0.0033
0.0727
-0.0608
0.0689
0.0066
0.3441
0.0687
-0.0861
-0.0659

INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations

YES
YES
240

-2.59 ***
-1.33
1.00
-1.09
1.38
-0.26
0.11
1.73
0.03
0.52
-0.42
0.83
0.69
0.93
1.20
-1.08
0.83
0.59
1.63
0.72
-1.75 *
-0.18

0.0042
0.0147
-0.0027
-0.0276
-0.1780
-0.0052
0.0115
0.0128
-0.0038
0.0722
0.0039
0.0058
-0.0108
0.0004
-0.0375
0.0549
0.0911
-0.0007
0.0736
0.0170
-0.0059
-0.2256

0.29
0.12
-0.88
-0.34
-1.19
-0.20
0.36
1.33
-0.88
0.64
1.23
0.06
-0.56
0.15
-0.84
1.40
1.52
-0.08
0.59
0.25
-0.17
-0.77

YES
YES
305

R2
0.35
0.31
Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of new ACM appointments
using other financial reporting quality measures. The dependent variables are MoB%_Appointer and
LossAvoid_Appointer. MoB%_Appointer is defined as the percentage of quarters the appointer firm
meets/beats the analyst consensus forecasts by three cents per share or less within the 4 quarters of the fiscal
year prior to the ACM appointment. LossAvoid_Appointer is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1
if the appointer firm's earnings is between 0 and 1 cent in the fiscal year just prior to the appointments, and 0
otherwise. The independent variables are MoB%_Appointee and LossAvoid_Appointee. All firm financial
variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please see Appendix A for
the variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 11
Selection of new non-ACM Directors - Other Financial Reporting Quality Measures

Dependent Variable :

(1)
MoB%_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

(2)
LossAvoid_Appointer
Coefficients t-Statistics

Test Variable:

MoB%_Appointee
LossAvoid_Appointee

-0.0758

-1.43
-0.0029

-0.06

0.0073
-0.0076
0.0000
0.0596
-0.3291
-0.0215
-0.0297
-0.0087
-0.0004
0.1632
-0.0020
0.0034
0.0010
0.0529
-0.0078
-0.0078
0.0355
-0.0514
-0.0063
-0.0079

0.76
-0.05
0.03
0.76
-1.78 *
-0.45
-1.30
-1.56
-0.11
1.89 *
-0.92
0.25
0.53
1.76
-0.28
-1.23
0.41
-0.91
-0.27
-0.03

Control Variables:

Size_Appointer
ROA_Appointer
MTB_Appointer
Leverage_Appointer
CFO_Appointer
Salegrowth_Appointer
Duality_Appointer
Boardsize_Appointer
Boardtenure_Appointer
Board_Ind%_Appointer
Ceotenure_Appointer
MultipleDirector
Age
Female
Ind_expertise
Size_Appointee
ROA_Appointee
Big4_Appointer
Sameauditor
Intercept

0.0056
0.2440
0.0032
0.1173
-0.2623
0.0014
0.0130
-0.0049
0.0047
0.1683
0.0030
-0.0062
0.0047
-0.0137
-0.0187
0.0087
0.0974
-0.0906
0.0054
-0.5015

INDUSTRY DUMMY
YEAR DUMMY
Number of Observations

YES
YES
406

0.45
1.16
1.16
1.09
-1.02
0.02
0.43
-0.61
1.04
1.42
1.11
-0.36
1.93 *
-0.35
-0.51
1.09
0.56
-1.15
0.18
-1.59

YES
YES
476

R2
0.28
0.29
Notes: This table presents the coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of new non-ACM
director appointments using other financial reporting quality measures. The dependent variables are
MoB%_Appointer and LossAvoid_Appointer. MoB%_Appointer is defined as the percentage of
quarters the appointer firm meets/beats the analyst consensus forecasts by three cents per share or
less within the 4 quarters of the fiscal year prior to the non-ACM director appointments.
LossAvoid_Appointer is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the appointer firm's
earnings is between 0 and 1 cent in the fiscal year just prior to the appointments, and 0 otherwise.
The independent variables are MoB%_Appointee and LossAvoid_Appointee. All firm financial
variables are winsorized at the 1% level each tail to deal with outlier observations. Please see
Appendix A for the variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variables

Definitions

Dependent Variable:
DA_Appointer

Appointer firm's abnormal accruals in the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment.

LossAvoid_Appointer

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the appointer firm's earnings is between 0 and 1 cent in
the fiscal year prior to the appointments, and 0 otherwise.
The percentage of quarters the appointer firm meets/beats the analyst consensus forecasts by three cents per
share or less within the 4 quarters of the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment.

Change in DA_Appointer

The change in appointer firm’s abnormal accruals between the fiscal year prior to (Yt-1) and the fiscal year
subsequent to (Yt+1) the appointment (Yt).
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MoB%_Appointer

Test Variables:

Gap

The difference between appointer firm's rank of discretionary accruals and appointee firm's rank of
discretionary accruals.

Negative

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the value of the variable Gap is negative, and 0
otherwise.

DA__Appointee

Appointee firm's abnormal accruals in the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment.

LossAvoid__Appointee

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the appointee firm's earnings is between 0 and 1 cent in
the fiscal year prior to the appointment, and 0 otherwise.

MoB%__Appointee

The percentage of quarters the appointee firm meets/beats the analyst consensus forecasts by three cents per
share or less within the 4 quarters of the fiscal year prior to the ACM appointment.

Control Variables:
Appointer Firms
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Size_Appointer

Appointer firm's natural log of total assets.

ROA_Appointer

Appointer firm's performance, which is the ratio of net income to total assets.

MTB_Appointer

Market to book ratio, defined as appointer firm's market value of equity over book value of equity.

Leverage_Appointer

Leverage ratio, defined as appointer firm's long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over total assets.

CFO_Appointer

Cash flow from operating activities deflated by total assets.

Salegrowth_Appointer

Sales growth, defined as appointer firm's percentage change in total sales.

Boardsize_Appointer

The number of board members of appointer firm's in the fiscal year prior to the appointment.

Board_Ind%_Appointer

The ratio of the number of independent directors to board size in the fiscal year prior to the appointment.

Duality_Appointer

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the appointer firm's CEO is the chairman of the board,
and 0 otherwise.

Ceotenure_Appointer

The number of years CEO works for the appointer firm as of the year prior to the ACM appointment.

Boardtenure_Appointer

The average number of years that incumbent board members have served as of the year prior to the ACM
appointment.

Big4_Appointer

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the appointer firm hires a Big 4 auditor to audit their
financial statements in the fiscal year prior to the appointment, and 0 otherwise.

Appointee Firms
Size__Appointee

Appointee firm's natural log of total assets.

ROA__Appointee

Appointee firm's performance, which is the ratio of net income to total assets.

ACM Characteristics:
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MultipleDirector

The number of new ACM's other directorships.

Age

The age of new ACM in the year prior to the appointment.

Female

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the ACM is a female, and 0 otherwise.

Ind_expertise

An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the new ACM comes from a firm in the same industry as
the appointer firm, and 0 otherwise.

Financial_expertise

An indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the new ACM has financial expertise and 0 otherwise.

Other Variables:
Interlocked

An indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if a common director or executive serves both the appointer
firm and appointee firm in the fiscal year prior to the appointment , and 0 otherwise.

Sameauditor

An indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the appointer firm hires the same auditor as the appointee
firm in the fiscal year prior to the appointment and 0 otherwise.
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